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Abstract
This study examines how Taiwan’s parties conducted candidate selection in 
the 2005 and 2009 local executive elections and the consequences of these 
processes. It has adopted standard methods for measuring candidate selection 
and applied them to Taiwanese parties. It shows that, although both major 
parties employed very similar inclusive nomination methods in 2005, they 
diverged four years later, with the Democratic Progressive Party using a highly 
centralized candidate selection mechanism. We challenge the assumption that 
primaries undermine election campaigns and instead argue that, when the 
party allows the formal nomination process to take place, its candidates gain 
legitimacy and perform well. In general, primaries appear to promote local 
party unity and help to avoid the rise of rebel candidates. Nomination timing 
appears to have an effect on electoral outcomes in our sample cases, a finding 
that has not been addressed in the existing literature.
Keywords:  Candidate selection, political parties, local elections, nomination, 
Taiwan.
 
During the Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) era, Taiwan’s main political parties were 
poles apart when it came to nomination methods. The Democratic Progressive 
Party’s (民進黨, DPP’s) candidate selection primaries enhanced its democratic 
credentials vis-à-vis the comparatively authoritarian decision-making practices 
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of the Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT) and other political parties of Taiwan.1 
The KMT’s top-down approach to nomination was exemplified by Lee’s 
single-handed selection of Lien Chan (連戰) as nominee to be his successor 
as president in 1999. For much of the post-2000 period, Taiwan’s two main 
parties converged on the methods they employed to select their candidates. 
Mixed primaries, in which public opinion surveys and party member voting 
accounted for 70 and 30 percent of the decision weight, respectively, became 
the nomination standard for both the DPP and the KMT.2 In the decisive 
elections in 2008, the two parties used this system for both legislative and 
presidential candidate nominations.3
In early 2008, the KMT’s landslide presidential and legislative election 
victories brought it to power in Taiwan’s second change of ruling parties. In 
the aftermath of these setbacks, the DPP conducted the most radical overhaul 
of its nomination system since it first introduced primaries in the late 1980s. 
Under its new party chairwoman, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), the DPP abandoned 
primaries in favor of a centralized nomination committee. The official 
nominating body became the Election Strategy Small Group (選戰策略小組, 
ESSG). This reform was justified by the claim that primaries had contributed to 
the party’s severe defeats in 2008 and that a repeat of such nomination disputes 
could put the party in danger of being completely wiped out in the 2009 local 
executive elections. By contrast, the victorious KMT saw no reason to adjust 
its nomination methods following one of its most successful post-martial-law 
elections.4 Thus, in 2009, Taiwan’s voters observed an unfamiliar scenario of 
the former authoritarian party, the KMT, operating internally in a far more 
democratic manner than the Democratic Progressive Party.
Until recently, the vast majority of research on candidate selection has 
1 Although the DPP changed its candidate selection system on a number of occasions, it never 
abandoned primaries prior to 2008. It also should be noted that there was some negative press 
coverage of the DPP’s primaries as a result of the practice of recruiting pocket members to 
manipulate the process. However, the DPP primaries allowed the party to avoid the kind of 
damaging rebel candidate phenomenon that severely undermined the KMT in the 1990s.
2 For a discussion of the nomination systems of Taiwan’s parties, see Wu Chung-li, Zhengdang 
yu Xuanju: Lilun yu shijian [Parties and elections: Theory and practice] (Taipei: Sanmin, 2008), 
77-146, and Wang Yeh-li, Bijiao xuanju zhidu [Comparative election systems] (Taipei: Wunan, 
2003), 153-196.
3 The KMT did not hold a competitive primary for the presidential election. However, it would 
have done so if a serious candidate had challenged Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) for nomination. In 
fact, the 2005 KMT party chairman election had served as its presidential primary, as Ma’s 
resounding victory convinced Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) that he would not be able to beat Ma in a 
competitive election.
4 In terms of parliamentary seat shares after the lifting of martial law, the KMT’s 2008 share has 
been beaten by only the 78 percent it gained in the 1991 National Assembly election. Moreover, 
when the allied party and allied independents are factored in, the KMT’s 2008 seat share exceeds 
three-quarters.
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focused on either American or Western European parties.5 However, as many 
third-wave democracies enter their third decade of multiparty elections, there 
has been a corresponding increase in studies of their candidate selection 
procedures.6 The relatively institutionalized state of Taiwan’s parties compared 
with many other new democracies makes it an ideal environment in which to 
test and adapt existing frameworks and theories concerning candidate selection. 
In addition to establishing why candidate selection is important, comparative 
research on candidate selection has focused primarily on two core areas.7 First, 
a major research stream addresses how parties select candidates, practices 
which analysts frequently attempt to locate on a spectrum from “inclusiveness” 
or “democratic” to “exclusiveness” or “authoritarian,” or alternatively on a 
spectrum of “localized” versus “centralized” nomination.8 Second, analysts 
have addressed why parties adopt certain nomination methods and seek to 
assess the consequences. In this study, we provide estimates of where Taiwan’s 
parties are located in terms of the regular standard for measuring candidate 
selection methods, and assess whether the consequences of nomination methods 
in Taiwan differ from those predicted by theories of Western party behavior. 
To do so, we examine how Taiwan’s parties nominated candidates for local 
executive elections in 2005 and 2009. Although much of the prior literature on 
candidate selection focuses on elections to national office, our case selection 
5 This was apparent, for instance, in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, eds., Candidate 
Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics (London: Sage, 1988), and 
the special edition on candidate selection in Party Politics 7, no. 3 (May 2001).
6 For example, on Latin America, see Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern, “Candidate 
Recruitment and Selection in Latin America: A Framework of Analysis,” Latin American 
Politics and Society 50, no. 4 (2008): 27-58; on Argentina, see Miguel De Luca et al, “Backroom 
or Ballot Boxes? Candidate Nomination in Argentina,” Comparative Political Studies 35 
(2002): 413-436; on Mexico, see Steven Wuhs, “Democratization and Dynamics of Candidate 
Selection Rule Change in Mexico: 1991-2003,” Mexican Studies 22 (2006): 33-55; on Spain, 
see Bonnie Field, “Transitions to Democracy and Internal Party Rules: Spain in Comparative 
Perspective,” Comparative Politics 39 (2006): 83-102; on Brazil, see David Samuels, “Political 
Ambition, Candidate Recruitment and Legislative Politics in Brazil,” in Pathways to Power: 
Political Recruitment and Legislative Politics in Brazil, ed. Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008); and on Croatia, see Mirjana 
Kasapovic, “Nominating Procedures in Democratic Polities,” Politika Misao 38 (2001): 3-17.
7 For reviews of the state of the field, see Michael Gallagher, “Introduction,” in Candidate 
Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics, ed. Michael Gallagher 
and Michael Marsh (London: Sage, 1988), 1-19; Reuvan Hazan, “Candidate Selection,” in 
Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting, ed. Lawrence 
LeDuc, Richard Niemi, and Pippa Norris (London: Sage, 2002), 108-126; and Bonnie Field and 
Peter Siavelis, “Candidate Selection Procedures in Transitional Polities,” Party Politics 14, no. 5 
(2008): 620-639.
8 For application of these frameworks in the Taiwan case for centralization, see Wu Chung-li 
and Dafydd Fell, “Taiwan’s Party Primaries in Comparative Perspective,” Japanese Journal of 
Political Science 2, no. 1 (2001): 23-45. For democratization, see Dafydd Fell, “Inner Party 
Democracy in Taiwan, Journal of Electoral Studies 13, no. 2 (November 2006): 167-198.
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is based on the significant “before and after” timing of these local executive 
elections. As noted above, in 2005, both parties employed similar nomination 
procedures, but sharply diverged following the DPP’s disastrous performance 
in the national elections in 2008. Thus, the selection of nonnational elections 
in 2005 and 2009 provides the opportunity to compare party behavior under 
different conditions, both within the parties themselves and in terms of the 
national political landscape (e.g., the change of party holding the presidency 
in 2008).
Focus on Nomination
Political scientists generally agree that candidate selection is one of the most 
important functions that political parties undertake, with strong implications 
for the health of the democratic system and quality of governance.9 However, 
within-party struggles to secure nomination for favored candidates can be as 
fractious a power struggle as anything else that parties do. Political leaders 
design their parties’ nomination systems in order to improve their electoral 
prospects, strengthen their power base within the party, and enhance party 
unity. Taiwan’s major parties have been highly innovative and adaptable 
in their nomination methods, developing a number of complex candidate 
selection procedures that are unique to Taiwan. In the summer of 2008, the 
first author conducted extensive interviews in Taiwan with party politicians 
on the topic of candidate selection.10 Although the DPP’s new regulations had 
not yet been passed, it was clear that the party center was planning to use 
centralized appointment instead of primaries. The interviews revealed three 
prevalent views on how the DPP should nominate in the future.11 The first was 
that the party’s experience in 2008 meant that its old primary system was too 
divisive and instead should be replaced by the centralized negotiated approach 
that Tsai was promoting. As the Taipei County branch chief, Wu Ping-jui (吳
秉叡), argued,
9 Gallagher, “Introduction,” in Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective.
10 In the summer of 2008, Dafydd Fell conducted thirty interviews and one focus group. Those 
interviewed included party-center cadres, local party branch chiefs, and elected politicians with 
experience of multiple elections. Interviews took place in Taipei and county/city branches all 
over Taiwan. He was able to speak to a rough balance of KMT and DPP respondents. Generally, 
interviews lasted thirty-five to forty minutes and were semistructured. They aimed at eliciting 
respondents’ experiences and views regarding party nomination systems.
11 Another very common theme in the DPP interviews was the “remove the blues” surveys (排藍
民調). This refers to questions on the survey component of the primary that were designed to 
remove non-DPP voters from the sample. This was to avoid KMT interference in the DPP’s 
nomination and also to favor more extreme DPP politicians. Since the DPP dropped the “remove 
the blues” survey in the spring of 2008 and did not formally include surveys in the nomination 
process, we have not included this matter in the main text of this study.
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The reason for this measure is the experience of defeat in 
the DPP’s legislative primaries, the big conflict, and [the] 
disunity in the party. So it was agreed that we should not hold 
such bloody primaries. So in order to avoid primaries, we are 
seeking a more reasonable mechanism. The more reasonable 
method is to empower the Central Executive Committee to use 
appointment to nominate; this way we can avoid primaries.12
A variant of this first view was that primaries should be avoided for 2009, 
but that, in the long-term, the party would need to return to an institutionalized 
and perhaps democratic nomination system. For instance, then DPP Secretary 
General Chen Chi-mai (陳其邁) summed up the dilemma the party faced at the 
time over nomination:
Whether negotiation will create more problems or primaries 
will create more problems, it’s hard to say. So we have to 
try [the negotiated approach]. So we are learning our lesson 
from painful experience. Finally, we will reach a result. But 
it’s hard to say. Currently, I see how they are discussing the 
local executive candidate negotiations; the progress is very 
slow. Personally, I think it is hard to say whether this is a 
good method.13
A third perspective was that it was wrong to blame primaries for the 
party’s 2008 setbacks, and, although the system might still require some fine 
tuning, primaries should be maintained for 2009. Tainan County Magistrate 
Su Huan-chih (蘇煥智) was one respondent who stressed the positive role 
that the primary system had played over the years. As Su explained, “The 
most important aspect of the [old] nomination system was how to handle the 
situations where negotiation had failed. In the past, we had the primary system 
and it had been in place for the past ten to twenty years. ...My view is that, if 
you remove the primaries, it will exacerbate the disputes.”14 In fact, Su was one 
of the few high-level voices that spoke out for the maintenance of primaries 
during the 2009 local executive nomination process.
In contrast, interviews revealed a high degree of satisfaction with the 
existing nomination methods within the KMT. There were only a handful of 
respondents who suggested minor changes, such as including cadre evaluation 
in the primary weighting. One of the most common views among KMT 
politicians was that primaries should be avoided as much as possible, with 
12 Interview with first author, Taipei, August 18, 2008.
13 Interview with first author, Taipei, August 15, 2008.
14 Interview with first author, Tainan, August 12, 2008.
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negotiation the ideal method of selecting candidates. This perspective is 
reflected in the comments of then KMT Secretary General Wu Den-yih (吳敦
義):
In my view the best way is, if it is clear there is an outstanding 
person, everyone agrees he’s very good, then there does not 
need to be a primary. After negotiation we can nominate him 
for the election. This is the best strategy. Regardless of the 
situation, once you start the primary process, it’ll be costly, 
no matter whether there are two, four or five candidates. Once 
you start the primary, there will be mutual criticism; it’s for 
competition.15
The view that primaries were the best means of actually resolving 
nomination conflicts and thus avoiding rebel candidates was less common. 
This positive take on primaries was more prevalent among politicians without 
local factional affiliation and based in Taipei. In response to a question 
asking whether primaries are divisive, one former KMT campaign manager 
commented,
I think it is the opposite. Look at who stood as rebels in 2004 
[in Taipei]. In 2006, out of the eight candidates [in the KMT 
Kaohsiung mayoral primary], who dared rebel? No one. And 
who dared to not support the winning candidate? On the 
surface, it was not possible not to support the winner.16
Nomination in Practice: Executive Races in 2005 and 2009
Observing elections over a long period of time suggests that there is frequently a 
disconnect between the formal nomination regulations and the actual operation 
of the process. For instance, even where primaries are the principle nomination 
method, frequently negotiation has been employed to prevent more than one 
candidate from registering or to persuade registered candidates to withdraw so 
that primaries can be avoided. As is often the case for political parties in Taiwan, 
DPP nomination for the 2009 races occurred in a series of stages or waves, 
with the earliest in November 2008 and the final district candidate nominated 
as late as October 2009, less than two months before the actual vote. Overall, 
the DPP’s nomination was completed much earlier than in previous campaigns 
such as in 2005, with the majority of districts (nine of thirteen) nominated by 
the time the KMT began its first wave in April 2009. Another obvious trend 
15 Interview with first author, Taipei, July 25, 2008.
16 Interview with first author, London, November 18, 2009.
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in DPP nomination was the degree to which the party center dominated the 
process in 2009. With the exception of the two cases in which incumbents 
were standing for reelection, in Yunlin and Pingtung counties, the party center 
was the key decision maker in candidate selection. In cases when there was 
a degree of competition for nomination, success depended on which side the 
party center favored. Compared to previous elections, such as in 2005, the local 
party and party supporters were far less influential in the nomination process 
in 2009. One way in which we can observe the party center’s domination of 
the process is in the large number of “outsiders” who gained nomination in 
2009 rather than local legislators or party cadres. For instance, party-center 
cadres were nominated in Keelung City and Taoyuan and Miaoli counties, 
and proportional-representation legislators were nominated in Chiayi City 
and Changhua County. In Penghu, Nantou, and Hsinchu counties, the party 
center appointed candidates who had no previous electoral experience in these 
districts and had developed their political careers elsewhere. For instance, 
the DPP candidate in Penghu, Tsai Chien-hsing (蔡見興), had served as a 
Kaohsiung City councilor between 1985 and 2006, including four terms as a 
KMT councilor. In contrast to local elections in 2005,17 the level of centralized 
nomination of local executives was greater than at any point since the DPP had 
been a legal organization, with no formal role in the selection process for party 
members, party activists, or even party supporters.
In most districts, the level of competition for nomination was quite low 
compared to previous years. Part of the reason was due to the low morale 
within the DPP following its 2008 defeats and also because some of the 
contested districts in 2009 were viewed as hopeless for the DPP. In some of 
these districts, rather than arbitrating between competing candidates, the party 
center struggled to find anyone willing to stand for election. In Hualien, for 
example, for the first time since the 1980s, the DPP eventually chose not to 
nominate and instead supported a KMT rebel.18 In both Miaoli and Taoyuan, 
the ESSG repeatedly hit a brick wall in its attempts to persuade anyone 
remotely electable to stand. In Taoyuan, the party nomination was especially 
troublesome, and when the party finally selected former legislator Cheng Pao-
ching (鄭寶清) in September 2009, Cheng turned down the nomination. It was 
not until October 4, 2009, that Tsai handpicked DPP Propaganda Department 
chief, Cheng Wen-tsang (鄭文燦), whose only previous electoral experience 
had been as a Taoyuan County councilor in 1998.
17 In 2005, primaries were conducted in six of the seven constituencies where more than one 
candidate registered, namely Yilan County, Hsinchu City, Chiayi City, and Yunlin, Nantou, and 
Taichung counties.
18 It chose to back the Hualien deputy local executive, Chang Chih-ming (張志明). Tsai Ing-wen 
even went to his campaign headquarters to offer support.
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In Yilan, although the KMT’s Lu Guo-hua (呂國華) was vying for 
reelection as county magistrate, the DPP previously had held the position and 
thus expected that there would be real competition for nomination. Indeed, 
Yilan became the district in which both parties invested the most resources, 
with both the DPP and KMT producing TV ads and making more party-chair 
visits for endorsement than any other district.19 However, what was surprising 
was that none of the party’s former legislators or local executives from the 
county openly sought nomination. Instead, nomination was contested among 
a township mayor, a county councilor, and an academic, none of whom was 
well-known outside the county. News reports regarding the contest revealed 
the exclusive and centralized nature of the nomination process. For instance, 
although the party center had pledged to make the results of opinion surveys 
one of the major criteria for selection, county councilor Hsieh Chih-deh (謝志
得) withdrew his candidacy as a result of the alleged bias of the party center. 
According to Hsieh, certain factions in the party center spread rumors that it 
already had determined which candidate it would appoint.20 When asked to 
comment on these accusations, the county branch explained that the power to 
nominate local executives was at the party center and that the party branch was 
not involved in candidate negotiations.21 The party center undoubtedly had a 
favored candidate, and in November 2008, Lotung mayor, Lin Tsung-hsien (林
聰賢), was nominated in the first wave of DPP nominations. Under the old DPP 
nomination system, such a competitive district would have held a primary in 
the spring before voting day. Thus, centralized nomination enabled the DPP to 
complete the nomination process far earlier than in the past.
In Changhua County, the contestants were better-known, including 
a serving national proportional representation legislator and former local 
executive, Wong Chin-chu (翁金珠), former legislator, Wei Ming-ku (魏明
谷), and former legislator and Changhua County party branch chief, Charles 
Chiang (江昭儀). Chiang was the one candidate who publicly campaigned 
for nomination in the county itself. He was reported to have issued leaflets 
and mobilized party activists to support his nomination bid. For instance, he 
organized a vote among township branch chiefs on their preference for the 
DPP candidate, in which, not surprisingly, Chiang was most popular.22 In 
mid-March, the majority of the branch chiefs issued a statement voicing their 
opposition to the party’s nominating Wong.23 In late March, he even held a 
19 Peng Huai-en, Norman Peng, and Annie Hui-ling Chen, “The Coattail Effect and the Permanent 
Political Party Campaign-Empirical Research from Taiwan,” paper presented at the Political 
Studies Association (UK) Conference, Edinburgh, March 2010, 13.
20 United Daily News, October 16, 2008, C1 Yilan/Hualien.
21 Ibid.
22 United Daily News, November 25, 2008, C1 Changhua/Nantou.
23 United Daily News, March 11, 2009, C1 Changhua/Nantou.
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public ceremony to mark the establishment of his election support group.24 In 
contrast, Wong stated publicly that she was not actively seeking nomination 
and that the nomination power was at the party center.25 Chiang’s efforts were 
fruitless, as the party center made the nomination decision without significant 
local input. It was the potential candidates’ relationship with the party center 
that mattered. Eventually, Chiang complained that there was no longer any 
point in continuing to seek nomination, as the New Tide faction controlled 
the party center and it was determined to nominate Wong.26 Media reports 
of the final negotiations also seem to suggest that the party center was not 
taking the process especially seriously. One report claimed that the negotiation 
was rushed through in less than five minutes and that Chiang even claimed he 
had been tricked into coming, having been falsely told that Wong was going 
to withdraw from the race.27 Although greater competition meant that the 
Changhua nomination was completed slightly later than in Yilan, coming in 
the third wave in April 2009, it was as exclusive and centralized as the previous 
case in the decision-making process.
Ironically, the most bitterly contested nomination was for a district that 
ultimately did not hold an election. In the summer of 2009, it was decided 
to postpone the election for Tainan County for one year, as Tainan County 
and City were to be merged. However, by this time, the DPP already had 
formally nominated a candidate. Perhaps because Tainan County is one of 
the DPP’s strongest vote bases and the chances of electoral success were the 
greatest, the competition was especially intense.28 On this occasion, the five 
contestants were the former local executive (1993-2001) Chen Tang-shan 
(陳唐山), legislators Yeh Yi-jin (葉宜津) and Lee Chun-yee (李俊毅), deputy 
local executive Yen Chun-tzuo (顏純左), and former legislator and the county 
branch chief Cheng Kuo-chung (鄭國忠). Media reports already had discussed 
five interested candidates in January 2008, almost two years prior to the 
election.29 A small group was established by the ESSG to handle candidate 
recommendations. This group held discussions with the main candidates in 
September.30 Throughout the process, deputy local executive Yen was the most 
critical of the party center’s handling of the nomination, repeatedly calling for 
a return to the primary system.31 He argued that the system needed to consider 
24 United Daily News, March 26, 2009, C2 Changhua/Nantou.
25 United Daily News, March 11, 2009, C1 Changhua/Nantou.
26 United Daily News, April 22, 2009, A8.
27 Ibid.
28 In 2004 and 2008, the DPP received its highest presidential vote share in Tainan County, and 
in 2008, the county was one of the only two cities or counties in which all of its legislative 
candidates were elected. The other was Tainan City.
29 United Daily News, January 18, 2008, C2 Tainan County.
30 United Daily News, September 8, 2008, C1 Tainan County.
31 United Daily News, July 8, 2008, C2 Tainan County.
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party members’ opinions or risk losing their support, and also noted the lack 
of transparency regarding opinion surveys. For instance, Yen observed that it 
was not clear when the surveys would take place, who would conduct them, 
what would be asked, and even whether the survey results would determine the 
nomination or be just a reference source.32 Cheng and Lee were also critical of 
the process, Lee arguing that letting the ESSG decide meant that people would 
suspect that the process had been determined secretly by factions.33
The first stage of the nomination process was relatively straightforward, 
as opinion polls in December showed that Chen, Lee, and Yeh all beat their 
potential KMT opponents by wide margins. In contrast, Cheng and Yen 
outpolled one potential KMT candidate but lost to the other in the polls.34 
Next, negotiations were attempted to produce a single candidate, but none of 
the three leaders was prepared to drop out. Although Su Huan-chih and other 
party members called for a primary to resolve the difficulties, Tsai Ing-wen 
rejected this, fearing it would further exacerbate party splits.35 The problem 
for the party center was that the leader in the polls was Chen. There were a 
number of reasons why Chen did not suit the party center. First, at seventy-four 
years of age, he did not fulfill the new and youthful image that the party was 
attempting to project. In addition, Chen was closely associated with former 
president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), having served as secretary general of the 
presidential office and as foreign minister. Moreover, it was believed that he 
was Chen Shui-bian’s preferred candidate. Thus, Chen’s nomination would 
cast doubt on whether the DPP had come out from under the shadow of the 
Chen Shui-bian political corruption scandals. Lastly, there was considerable 
opposition to Chen from the existing local executive, as the two had been rivals 
since the 1990s.
Months of negotiations were fruitless in early 2009, as all three leading 
candidates refused to withdraw. Yeh and Lee called for a generational 
replacement,36 while Chen called on the party to nominate the most popular 
candidate in the polls.37 However, by the end of March, it was clear that the 
party center was considering only Yeh and Lee.38 Eventually, the party center 
announced Lee as its official candidate in April as part of the third wave of 
nominations.39 While Yeh accepted the party’s decision, Chen insisted that 
he would stand, regardless of the party’s decision, and used the unfairness of 
32 United Daily News, October 6, 2008, C1 Tainan County.
33 United Daily News, October 6, 2008, 2009, C1 Tainan County.
34 United Daily News, December 3, 2008, C2 Tainan County.
35 United Daily News, December 25, 2008, C2 Tainan County.
36 United Daily News, January 7, 2009, C2 Tainan.
37 United Daily News, February 2, 2009, C2 Tainan.
38 United Daily News, April 1, 2009, A2.
39 United Daily News, April 2, 2009, A1.
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the nomination process as clear justification.40 Thus, the DPP was faced with 
the prospect of a challenge by a rebel candidate more popular than its official 
candidate, with rich election experience, and showing no signs of backing 
down. Chen even claimed that if he did not stand it would show he had “no 
balls.”41 Fortunately for the DPP, it was saved by the decision to postpone the 
election, owing to the creation of the Tainan special municipality.
In 2005, the KMT and DPP nomination waves occurred almost 
simultaneously. In contrast, the KMT’s nominations tended to be much later 
than the DPP’s in 2009. The first wave of KMT nominations took place in 
April 2009, with half the candidates determined. As the KMT was the ruling 
party in fourteen of seventeen contested districts, competition for nomination 
tended to be more intense than it had been for the DPP. Thus, for instance, the 
KMT did not have to desperately search for candidates to stand for seemingly 
hopeless seats in the same way as Tsai did. The KMT had a formal primary 
registration process, with interested candidates registering for primaries before 
certain deadlines. At this stage, the KMT’s districts could be divided into two 
categories. In 2005 and 2009, roughly half the districts (nine districts in 2005 
and eight in 2009) had only one candidate registering, while in the other half 
(ten districts in 2005 and nine in 2009) two or more candidates registered.
In the majority of the districts in which only one candidate registered in 
2005 and 2009, the registered candidate was the incumbent local executive, 
thus nomination was generally quite straightforward and uncontroversial. In 
these districts, although there was not a member primary or formal opinion 
polls to support the candidate’s selection, there was local party support for 
these candidates. Thus, the center did not need to intervene, as the nomination 
decision in essence already had been determined at the local level. We also 
cannot call these nominations undemocratic, as potential candidates had the 
opportunity to register for primaries, but chose not to or were persuaded not 
to. Among the districts with a single registered candidate, there were two 
exceptions in which KMT politicians chose not to register but still challenged 
the officially nominated candidate. The two cases were in Hsinchu County and 
Nantou County.
In Hsinchu, incumbent Cheng Yung-chin (鄭永金) was about to complete 
his second term, however, the one registered candidate was legislator Chiu 
Ching-chun (邱鏡淳). The two had been long-term rivals within the county. 
Back in 1997, Chiu’s rebel candidacy had prevented Cheng’s winning the 
executive election, allowing the DPP to win with only 36 percent of the vote. 
In 2001, the two had fought in the KMT primary, with Cheng coming out on 
top. Cheng thus sought an alternative to Chiu. Two candidates he originally 
considered backing were the deputy local executive and even his own wife. 
40 Ibid.
41 United Daily News, March 18, 2009, A4.
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Eventually, Cheng chose to risk party-center discipline and supported the 
KMT county council speaker, Chang Pi-ching (張碧琴). Chang, however, did 
not register for the primary, claiming that the system was unfair to new faces 
and questioned Chiu’s credibility for wanting to stand for local executive 
only a year after having been elected as a legislator in January 2008.42 The 
KMT deputy local executive also questioned Chiu’s loyalty for having left the 
KMT three times.43 The KMT party center had to choose between the county 
government and county councilors who were supporting the rebel Chang and 
the officially registered candidate. Moreover, Chiu led the polls for most of the 
campaign, although his lead over Chang was narrow. After negotiations failed, 
Chiu was officially nominated in the second wave, in May 2009. Subsequently, 
the party strove to persuade Chang to quit and for Cheng to cease supporting 
her; however, both efforts were in vain.
In Nantou, the only registered candidate was incumbent local executive Lee 
Chao-ching (李朝卿). However, he was challenged openly by two experienced 
KMT politicians who did not join the primary. The first was director of the 
Executive Yuan’s central region office, Chen Chih-pin (陳志彬), who had 
lengthy political experience as a legislator, county councilor, provincial 
assemblyman, and member of the provincial government. Chen Chih-pin had 
refused to join the primary, complaining of the unfair nature of the polls in the 
primaries. In fact, he had lost to Lee in the KMT primary in 2005.44 The second 
challenger was the director of the county government culture department, Chen 
Chen-sheng (陳振盛), who previously had stood unsuccessfully for the local 
executive position for the New Party in 1997 and for the People First Party in 
2001. Considering the huge opinion poll lead that Lee had, it is not entirely 
surprising that the KMT chose to stick with the system and not to conduct 
negotiations. Both rebels faced pressure from the local party and center to 
withdraw, and before the candidate registration deadline Chen Chih-pin was 
persuaded not to stand, but Chen Chen-sheng still ran for office after being 
expelled from the party.
Of the nine districts with more than one registered candidate, in 2009, the 
KMT began the primary preparation process in eight of them. The exception 
was the tiny off-shore island district of Lianchiang County (Mazu), where the 
party allowed open nomination. In other words, both registered candidates 
were endorsed by the party. Open nomination is a luxury permitted by the 
KMT in districts such as Lianchiang, where the DPP has no chance of winning 
42 United Daily News, April 4, 2009, C1 Hsinchu and Miaoli.
43 Ibid. Fell was able to find evidence of Chiu’s having left the party only once, in 1997, as a 
result of his rebel candidate status; a year later, he once again was nominated by the KMT as a 
legislative candidate.
44 United Daily News, December 15, 2008, C1 Changhua/Nantou.
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and usually does not even nominate candidates.45 Four years earlier, the KMT 
ran primaries in eight of ten such districts in which more than one candidate 
registered. In 2009, two districts, Pingtung and Yunlin, featured two registered 
candidates, but eventually the primaries were aborted as negotiation was used 
to persuade one candidate to withdraw. In Yunlin, the official process had 
formally begun and the first public debates among the primary candidates had 
been held between former legislators Hsu Shu-bo (許舒博) and Chang Li-shan 
(張麗善).46 However, the party center gave in to local factional pressure to 
convince Hsu to quit the race. Based on Hsu’s past record, it is highly likely 
that he would have won the primary, as he had easily won nomination in 
previous KMT primaries in 2004 and 2005. Chang is the sister of the former 
Yunlin County magistrate, Chang Jung-wei (張榮味), who led one of the main 
local factions and had a reputation for political corruption. This concession to 
local factions was not particularly successful, as in September Chang herself 
withdrew from the race, forcing the KMT to hastily find a candidate at the 
last minute. This time the party center completely dominated the process and, 
although polls were used to assess the electability of five potential candidates, 
the results were not released publicly. Finally, the party center appointed an 
academic, Wu Wei-chih (吳威志), to represent the party in what by this time 
was a hopeless contest.
The KMT also gave in to local factional pressures in the case of Pingtung, 
when it abandoned the primary in both 2005 and 2009. In the latter case, the 
two registered candidates were national proportional-representation legislator 
Liao Wan-ju (廖婉汝) and Pingtung County council speaker Chou Dian-lun (周
典論). As in Yunlin, it was local factional pressure that ensured the primaries 
were cancelled. Liao was so confident that she would win in a primary that 
she even offered to withdraw if she did not exceed Chou in the polls by 10 
percent.47 Nevertheless, the local party passed a resolution halting the primary 
and asking the party center to appoint a candidate through negotiation, which 
meant that the party center persuaded Liao to give way to Chou.48 Thus, as was 
the case in Yunlin, democracy and the nomination system were cast aside in 
compromises with local factions.
The KMT held eight primaries in 2005, and six in 2009 in Taoyuan, 
Kinmen, Taitung, Hsinchu City, Changhua, and Hualien. With the exception of 
Miaoli in 2005 and Hualien in 2009, these primaries were highly successful in 
avoiding serious party splits, in part because the nomination process followed 
party regulations. The relatively smooth operation of KMT primaries in these 
45 In fact, Lianchiang is the one district in which the DPP has never nominated a single 
candidate.
46 United Daily News, June 6, 2009, B2 Chiayi/Yunnan.
47 United Daily News, May 13, 2009, B2 Pingtung/Taidong.
48 United Daily News, July 23, 2009, B2 Pingtung/Taidong.
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cases was remarkable in a number of ways. In both Taitung and Changhua, 
incumbent local executives were challenged in the 2009 primaries by strong 
incumbent legislators. In the case of Taitung, the challenger defeated the 
incumbent executive and the county council speaker. But in both cases, the 
losers accepted the results and did not stand as rebels. Competition was 
especially strong in Kinmen and Hsinchu City, where primaries were contested 
by four and six candidates, respectively. In all these primaries except for 
the one in Hualien, the formal 30:70 system was employed, so that party 
members could participate, while the general public’s preferences also were 
considered.
The one district in which the primary was not a clear success in 2009 
was Hualien, undoubtedly because the party center’s interference was a key 
factor. From as early as mid-2008, five local Hualien-based politicians were 
campaigning openly for the KMT’s nomination. It had been planned to make 
Hualien part of the third round of nominations in June 2009, and all five 
interested candidates registered for the primary in May.49 However, on May 
22, it suddenly was announced that the party center had ordered the primary 
process stopped.50 It was reported that this was the decision of KMT chair Ma 
Ying-jeou, aimed at avoiding the election of a candidate charged in a pending 
corruption case, and that, instead, centrally appointed nomination would be 
employed, on a model similar to that used in Pingtung.51 The move was seen as 
targeted at legislator Fu Kun-chi (傅昆萁), who, although leading in the polls, 
was the defendant in a corruption case in which he already had been found 
guilty during the first trial.52
Originally, it appeared that Ma wanted to directly appoint Minister of 
Health Yeh Chin-chuan (葉金川) to be the KMT candidate, but there was 
considerable resistance at the local level to this top-down approach. Eventually, 
a compromise was reached in which sides agreed that only surveys would be 
used to select the candidate in the primary.53 This time, however, only Yeh, 
Hualien mayor Tsai Chi-ta (蔡啟塔), and County Agricultural Development 
Office director Tu Li-hua (杜麗華) registered. Fu was barred from joining and 
others among the original participants opted not to participate, as it was quite 
obvious that the party center was trying to manipulate the process to nominate 
Yeh, its preferred candidate. Nevertheless, the party center’s maneuvers 
backfired as there was a clear backlash against the imposed candidate. Tu won 
with almost 55 percent of the survey support, thus obtaining the KMT’s official 
nomination. However, the defeat of Ma’s candidate was not the worst of it for 
49 United Daily News, May 18, 2009, B1 Yilan/Hualien.
50 United Daily News, May 23, 2009, A1
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 United Daily News, August 2, 2009, A2.
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the KMT, as two of its politicians were able to use the unfairness of the party’s 
primaries as justification to stand as rebels against the official candidate, Tu.
In short, in the majority of districts in both campaigns, the KMT followed 
its nomination rules. Where one candidate registered, he or she was nominated, 
and when multiple candidates registered, primaries were held. When primaries 
were held, party members and supporters had a chance to participate in 
a relatively inclusive and localized nomination process. Only in Hualien 
and Pingtung (2005) and Yunlin and Pingtung (2009) did the party center 
completely compromise the primary system to please local factions. Overall, 
the decisive location of nomination decision making tended to be at the local 
level rather than in the party center. The case of Hualien in 2009 showed how 
the party center’s attempts to impose its preference for nomination at the local 
level could backfire.
Analysis and Discussion
In the preceding section, we have provided contextual information on the 
development of party nomination procedures and examined cases from the 
2005 and 2009 elections in detail. In this section, we present a broader empirical 
analysis, focusing on the levels of inclusivity, decentralization, and timing of 
nominations. Our aim in this analysis is to disentangle the main dynamics in 
Taiwanese electoral politics affecting the methods of party nominations in 
each of the nation’s districts. To better understand these dynamics, our analysis 
proceeded in three stages. First, to facilitate our analysis, we created a dataset 
with information on every local executive race in 2005 and 2009. Following 
Rahat and Hazan’s research on the inclusiveness of the selectorate,54 we 
classified the nomination procedure for every KMT- and DPP-nominated 
candidate in each district in the two electoral campaigns. Drawing on Lundell’s 
method for measuring centralization in candidate selection,55 we classified 
the nomination for each contest. We further recorded information on the 
timing of the nomination of candidates, the main source of influence on these 
nominations, and the degree of party unity around these nominations. These 
descriptive data are shown in tables 1a (2005) and 1b (2009) below.
Next we assessed the associations between each of our model predictors 
and the resulting nomination method. In order to capture each variable’s gross 
influence on this output, we opted for a cross-tabulation of each of these 
variables with the resulting nomination method. These results, presented in 
table 2, show that each of the predictors conditioned nomination methods and 
54 The term selectorate now is commonly used in the candidate selection literature to refer to the 
electorate that makes the nomination decision.
55 Krister Lundell, “Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in 
Comparative Perspective,” Party Politics 10 (2004): 25-47.
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that the differences in the distribution of nomination methods across these 
predictors were statistically significant. Looking at the results, we note several 
interesting findings. First, statistically significant differences between the two 
election years included in our sample suggest that both parties revised their 
philosophies toward nomination between the two electoral cycles. In 2005, the 
most frequent types of nomination were one-register and primary, cumulatively 
accounting for little under 70 percent of all cases. By contrast, in 2009, over 
41 percent of the candidates were appointed. Switching to party identity, 
we find confirmation of what we intimated earlier, namely, that the parties’ 
nomination methods were significantly different from one another. Across both 
elections, DPP candidates were eighteen times more likely to be appointed, 
compared to KMT candidates. Only one in every seven DPP candidates was 
nominated by means of primaries, compared to twice that ratio in the KMT. 
The main group of KMT candidates, four of every ten, were nominated by 
means of one candidate registering. Significant differences also were observed 
in the level of party unity. In the vast majority (70 percent) of nomination 
contests characterized by a high level of unity and no rebels, candidates were 
nominated by appointment or selected where only one candidate registered. In 
Table 2. Bivariate Associations between Model Predictors and Nomination 
Method (percentages)
Variable Values Appointed One register Primary Other Total Chi-square
Year 2005 10.9 39.1 30.4 19.6 100
2009 41.2 23.5 17.6 17.6 100
Total 23.8 32.5 25.0 18.8 100 10.3*
Party DPP 45.0 22.5 15.0 17.5 100
KMT   2.5 42.5 35.0 20.0 100
Total 23.8 32.5 25.0 18.8 100 20.9**
Unity Other 12.9 19.4 25.8 41.9 100
Unity 30.6 40.8 24.5   4.1 100
Total 23.8 32.5 25.0 18.8 100 19.7**
Wave First 17.6 67.6   8.8   5.9 100
Second 15.0 10.0 70.0   5.0 100
Third 38.5   3.8 11.5 46.2 100
Total 23.8 32.5 25.0 18.8 100 63.2**
Influence Local 4.4 53.3 40.0 2.2 100
Both 16.7 33.3 16.7 33.3 100
Central 69.6 - 4.3 26.1 100
Total 25.7 35.1 27.0 12.2 100 54.6**
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.001.
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the much smaller number of cases characterized by low unity, one-third of the 
nominations were based on appointment or only one candidate registering, and 
approaching half were conducted in other ways, such as through negotiation 
following cancelled primaries. The timing of a nomination also shows significant 
effects on the nomination method. Some two-thirds of first-wave nominations 
were conducted by means of one candidate registering, while 70 percent of 
second-wave nominations were achieved through primaries. In a little under 70 
percent of the cases where the central party exerted great influence, candidates 
were nominated by appointment. Conversely, where the main influence was at 
the local level, around 90 percent of the nominations were achieved by means 
of only one candidate registering or through primaries.
These descriptive findings suggest that each of the predictors in our study 
was associated significantly with the ultimate nomination method. Next, we 
wanted to establish these associations for each of the predictors, considering all 
other predictors simultaneously. To achieve this, we conducted a multinomial 
regression analysis in which we estimated the nomination method based on 
the joint effects of all our explanatory factors. Table 3 shows that, holding 
all other variables constant, DPP candidates were significantly more likely to 
be nominated by appointment than KMT candidates, and that nominations by 
appointment were more likely to occur under conditions of party unity. The 
results also stress the importance of timing: the earlier in the process (wave) 
candidates were chosen, the more likely they were nominated by means of a 
primary. After controlling for the effects of all variables simultaneously, the 
only significant difference between the KMT and the DPP was the appointment 
Table 3. Multinomial Logit Model Predicting Nomination Method  
(model coefficients and standard errors)
Appointed One Register Primary
B SE B SE B SE
Intercept -8.55* 4.02 5.33** 1.73 2.45 1.58
Round -0.30 0.85 -3.48*** 0.87 -1.22* 0.62
Party: DPPb 5.05** 1.84 -0.51 1.07 -0.67 0.90
Year: 2009c 5.10** 1.62 0.85 1.21 0.59 0.99
Unity: Yesd 5.80** 1.78 3.12** 1.18 2.24* 1.00
Chi-sq goodness of fit    214.5***
Nagelkerke R-sq             0.77
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Reference categories:
a. Other method of nomination
b. KMT
c. 2005
d. No unity
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nomination method, with the latter party significantly more likely to nominate 
by this method than the former. Employing these predictors, our multinomial 
model correctly predicted 70 percent of the sample cases in total.
One of the main findings in the literature of the consequences of types of 
candidate selection systems is that more inclusive nomination procedures tend 
to produce legislators who act independently.56 The reasoning is that when 
politicians owe their selection predominantly to party members or even to 
party supporters, they are less likely to follow the party line. Examining the 
number of politicians who stand for election without party endorsement or as 
rebel candidates is one way to assess whether centralized nomination appears 
to enhance party discipline. Certainly, the DPP fared well with its appointment 
method in 2009, with only two very minor rebels, compared to eight for the 
KMT. Using essentially the same inclusive and localized nomination system in 
2009, the KMT had far more rebel candidates than in either 2001 or 2005.57 Of 
the KMT cases in which primaries were used, losing primary candidates stood 
as rebels in only one case in 2005 (Miaoli) and one case in 2009 (Kinmen). 
All other rebel candidates were politicians who chose not to register for the 
primary. Strong competition in nomination primaries seems to have prevented 
KMT rebels from emerging in Taitung (2009), Hsinchu City (2009), Taoyuan 
(2009), Changhua (2005 and 2009), Taipei County (2005), and Nantou (2005). 
The picture is similar for the DPP in 2005, when there was more intense 
competition for party endorsement, but only one primary loser stood as a rebel 
(Nantou). Despite the change in the DPP toward centralized and exclusive 
nomination, there was no significant increase in rebel candidates compared to 
previous elections.58
Interviews with political figures in Taiwan reveal two different perceptions 
about party primaries. One view is that competitive primaries produce disunity, 
which can impair the party’s electoral results;59 the counterargument is that 
primaries are the best way to resolve intra-party nomination disputes and 
provide greater legitimacy to the officially nominated candidates. In practice, 
the KMT generally used inclusive selection methods when there was internal 
competition for nomination. In 2005, of the eight districts in which the KMT 
ran primaries, it maintained party unity in almost all cases (and nominated 
candidates fared well in the elections). There is one counter-example in Miaoli, 
where the primary loser, Chiu Bing-kun (邱炳坤), switched sides and stood for 
56 Gideon Rahat and Reuven Hazan, “Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework,” 
Party Politics 7 (2001): 297-322, 314.
57 There had been only one KMT rebel in 2005 and four in 2001.
58 The DPP had one rebel in 2005 and four in 2001.
59 Wu and Fell show that this view was widespread from Taiwan’s first experience with member 
primaries in 1989. See Wu and Fell, “Taiwan’s Party Primaries in Comparative Perspective.”
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the DPP. Nonetheless, even in this case, the primary gave the official KMT 
candidate greater legitimacy, which he was able to leverage into a comfortable 
victory in Miaoli for the first time in eight years. In all five districts in which 
the KMT ran regular primaries in 2009, there was a high level of intra-party 
unity behind its candidates. But when formal primaries were cancelled (Yunlin, 
Pingtung, and Hualien), there were open local party divisions, although it is 
not clear in which way the causality runs here. KMT primaries in Hsinchu 
City, Taitung, Taoyuan, and Changhua all served to resolve serious nomination 
disputes and to avoid potentially damaging rebels. Although a rebel emerged 
after the Kinmen primary, the primary winner gained greater legitimacy in the 
general election. Similarly, the KMT’s resolution to stick with the registered 
candidates against rebels who had refused to join primaries, served to discredit 
the rebels at the general election in both Nantou and Hsinchu counties. If 
the KMT party center had risked factional displeasure and gone ahead with 
primaries in Yunlin and Pingtung according to the original timetable, it is 
unlikely that the party divisions or rebels would have caused their official 
candidates to perform as badly as they eventually did. This was particularly the 
case in Yunlin, where the DPP candidate achieved the highest vote share of any 
local executive in 2009: Su Chih-fen (蘇治芬) won 65.4 percent of the vote.
There is a mixed picture when it comes to the effect of nomination on the 
DPP campaigns. The Yilan and Yunlin primaries in 2005 helped to resolve 
nomination disputes and preserve party unity. However, in both the Chiayi 
City and Nantou primaries, incumbent DPP local executives were challenged, 
which led to party divisions and perhaps contributed to the party’s poor 
election results. In 2009, when the DPP’s nomination process was dominated 
by a small central party selectorate (ESSG), the DPP experienced quite severe 
intra-party splits for at least part of the campaigns in Chiayi County, Yilan, 
Nantou, Changhua, and Tainan County. The DPP’s first experiment with highly 
centralized nomination was based partly on the idea that this method could 
avoid local divisions, but this proved not to be the case, particularly in Tainan 
County and Changhua. In Changhua, it is likely that the manner of centralized 
nomination led to grass-roots divisions, resulting in a lack of support for the 
official candidate and giving the KMT incumbent a relatively easy ride. For the 
KMT, the picture was quite different, as the vast majority of nomination cases 
were determined at the local level. However, where the party center tried to 
interfere in the nomination process in 2009, internal splits were exacerbated. 
This was particularly evident in Yilan, Pingtung, Yunlin, Hsinchu County, and 
Hualien. In Hualien, the party center’s attempt to impose its own preferred 
candidate seriously backfired in one of its safest seats. All three candidates in 
the election had registered for the original KMT primary that was cancelled 
by the party center. The party center’s attempt to dictate candidate selection 
severely damaged the legitimacy of the official candidate, who ultimately 
received a mere 25 percent of the vote, less than either of the KMT rebels.
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One trend observed in many contemporary democracies is longer election 
campaigns, even permanent campaigns that begin as soon as the previous one 
ends.60 A lesson from the 2008 presidential election was that the KMT’s early 
nomination gave Ma an advantage over his DPP rival.61 While in 2005 the two 
parties made most of their nominations during the first wave in April through 
June, there were substantial differences in the two parties’ nomination timing 
in 2009, with the DPP generally nominating much earlier than the KMT. The 
main effect of the DPP’s centralized nomination method was that it facilitated 
earlier decision making compared to previous years, in the hope that it would 
give candidates sufficient time to build campaign momentum. DPP candidates 
in Keelung, Chiayi City, Yilan, and Penghu did surprisingly well against KMT 
incumbents, and their lengthy campaign preparations played a part in this 
performance. The DPP candidates performed especially well, and there were 
higher levels of party unity in the districts in which nominations were made 
during the first two waves in November 2008 and January 2009. In contrast, its 
candidates struggled to build momentum when nominated late in the campaign, 
such as in Miaoli, Changhua, and Taoyuan. The DPP previously had held the 
Nantou local executive position, but, in 2009, it struggled to find a candidate due 
to factional divisions. After much persuasion, it originally nominated former 
legislator Tang Huo-sheng (湯火聖) in March, but he soon quit the race as a 
result of a lack of support within the county. The DPP even approached a KMT 
rebel and a former DPP local executive, Lin Tsung-nan (林宗男), who had left 
the party after standing as a rebel in 2005. Eventually it chose to appoint former 
Taipei County legislator, Lee Wen-chung (李文忠), in July. This meant that the 
nomination was completed too late, and, therefore, Lee did not have sufficient 
time to mount an effective campaign. The problem of late nomination was also 
apparent in Taoyuan, where the DPP did not nominate Cheng until October. 
The fact that Cheng came so close to winning in Taoyuan after campaigning 
for only a few weeks suggests that, if the DPP had resolved nomination earlier, 
it would have had a reasonable chance of success. The main parties suffered 
similar problems in their late nominations in 2005, with poor results for the 
DPP in Keelung, Hualien, Hsinchu County, and Miaoli, and for the KMT in 
Chiayi County. However, in some cases, late nomination is a function of a 
relatively weak field and the absence of an obviously strong candidate, offering 
an alternative explanation for poor-performing late nominees.
60 Pippa Norris, “Campaign Communications,” in Comparing Democracies 2, ed. Lawrence 
LeDuc et al. (London: Sage, 2002), 127-147, 135.
61 Ma’s victory in the 2005 KMT party-chair election essentially resolved the party’s presidential 
nomination two and a half years before the election.
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Conclusions and Prospects for Future Nominations
This study has examined how Taiwan’s parties conducted candidate selection 
in the 2005 and 2009 local executive elections and the consequences of these 
processes. It has adopted standard methods for measuring candidate selection 
procedures and applied them to Taiwan’s political parties. It has shown 
that, although in 2005 both major parties employed very similar inclusive 
nomination methods, they diverged four years later, with the DPP using a 
highly centralized candidate selection mechanism. It would appear, however, 
that parties have again converged in their methods since 2009. For instance, the 
KMT chose not to use formal primaries to nominate its legislative by-election 
candidates in early 2010, while the DPP maintained its top-down nomination 
of by-election candidates. Since late 2010, the two parties also have converged 
in using survey-based primaries that offer no scope for the participation of 
party members. However, our assessment of the nomination process suggests 
that both parties may have misinterpreted their experiences in 2009. Although 
the DPP’s nomination went relatively smoothly, this had more to do with the 
lack of competition for nomination than with the abandonment of primaries. 
Indeed, had the Tainan County election gone ahead and the party suffered an 
embarrassing defeat, the reverse conclusion might have been reached. The 
KMT’s electoral setbacks in 2009 were not the result of holding primaries; 
indeed, where the party allowed the formal nomination process to take place, 
its candidates gained legitimacy and performed well.
The Taiwan case examined in this essay contradicts the observation in 
other contexts that inclusive nomination methods impair party discipline. In 
general, primaries appear to promote local party unity and help to avoid rebel 
candidates. A further difference is that an inclusive selectorate did seem to 
reduce the representativeness of chosen candidates and actually increased the 
level of competition facing incumbents in many cases in Taiwan. A finding 
that has not been addressed in existing literature is that nomination timing 
appears to have an effect on electoral outcomes in our sample cases. This 
preliminary assessment of the impact of candidate selection systems in Taiwan 
demonstrates that this under-researched area is a fruitful one in terms of 
substance and theory, which will increase in significance with further research 
over a longer time period and for different types of elections.
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